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1. Introduction 
The rural weaving industry in Japan during the period 1880 to 1920 
consisted of many small- and medium-sized companies, which were 
organized into cooperatives. The function of cooperatives included 
maintaining the quality of products and encouraging research activities. 
Other rural industries also formed cooperatives and consequently the 
output of entire regions would increase, rather than any one individual 
company benefiting. Entrepreneurs cooperated with each other to the 
extent that regional conglomerations were found in many rural parts of 
Japan.１ 
From the perspective of neo-classical economics, each company's 
decision-making was based on the principle of profit maximization, as a 
utilitarian approach adopts the principle of maximization of utility for 
personal decision-making. There is the possibility that the cooperation 
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brought benefits to every participating company, but it could not avoid 
restricting their free economic activities. 
As the following empirical studies of this article show, the cooperation 
by entrepreneurs and the consolidation in the form of cooperatives could 
not be attained without deliberate efforts by the people concerned. The 
purpose of this article is to analyze the process of initializing cooperative 
activity, the motivation of participants, especially leaders, and the 
factors that maintained the efficiency of cooperatives through the case 
studies of traditional weaving districts. 
The activity of cooperatives can be classified as one of collective 
action, and the result of the activity is regarded as social capital. 
Economic activity is made possible by various factors including culture.２
Therefore from the wider perspective of social science, the aim of this 
article is concerned with the relationship between social capital and 
economic activity. Before we start to examine the history of cooperatives, 
perspectives of this article should be explained further, since collective 
activity and cooperatives have been analyzed from various perspectives. 
Firstly, the relationship of between social capital and economic activity 
will be clarified. There are two distinguishable approaches concerning 
social capital in regard to economic activity: one takes social capital as 
an exogenous factor, the other as an indigenous factor. 
Piore and Sobel examined industrial districts comprised of small 
entrepreneurs and bound in a complex web of competition and 
cooperation. They argued, “The cohesion of the industry rests on a more 
fundamental sense of community, of which the various institutional forms 
of cooperation are more the result than the cause.” They emphasized 
“ethnic ties” and “shared politics and religion.”３ If we suppose normal 
motivation of entrepreneurs, cooperation among them must be an 
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exogenous factor. In other words, competitive entrepreneurs are 
inherently against cooperatives. Supposing community ties as an 
exogenous factor is theoretically consistent with the traditional viewpoint 
that their motivation can be explained only from privately-oriented 
objectives. 
Their emphasis on communities can be supported by this historical 
study of regional economies. Observation over a long period, however, 
revealed that community ties were not stable, and economic cooperation 
and community tie were mutually affected by each other. Therefore 
community ties cannot be estimated as one of the given economic factors 
under which entrepreneurs pursue their goals. The content and degree of 
community ties are important economic variants, and it should be 
explained how and why the ties were attained. 
On the other hand, some historical studies suppose mutuality as 
normal and consequently overlook the theoretical perspective that social 
bonds could worsen economic activity.４ As a conclusion to a historical 
comparison regarding Italian society, Putnam asserts: “stocks of social 
capital, ...tend to be self-reinforcing and cumulative. Virtuous circles 
resulted in social equilibria with high-levels of cooperation, trust, 
reciprocity, civic engagement and collective well-being.” ５  We will 
describe “reinforcing and cumulative” as it applies to the process of 
social capital in one of the weaving districts, where, however, the social 
bond experienced a negative effect. Therefore we try to clarify what kind 
of social and economic situation strengthens and loosens social ties. 
Secondly, the motivation of participants in cooperatives will be 
examined. Social capital, mutual trust and other factors are subjective. 
Therefore those factors are inconsistent with economic objective factors, 
price, volume, and so on. We face a difficult problem in placing subjective 
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factors in the system of decision-making. The motivation of 
entrepreneurs, especially leaders of cooperatives has critical importance 
in this context. 
After an organization was established and rules were accepted by 
participants, management of cooperatives became relatively easy 
compared to the initiation of such collective activity. Depending on the 
information available, individual participants could choose a policy to 
attain optimal results. E. Ostrom analyzed collective activity, albeit 
especially in common property resources, in a multi-layered and 
structured way and asserted that “Information about benefits must be 
searched for, organized, and analyzed” by participants.６ They uniquely 
estimate costs and benefits of collective action and consequently must 
consider the rules or objectives of cooperatives from a unique 
perspective. The process of exchanging opinions and reaching an 
integrated action program is an inevitable outcome. In the real world 
some people must plan collective action and propose others to take part 
in it. Initial efforts are a prerequisite, and some people must take the lead. 
From our observation of the history of cooperatives, we can assert that 
leaders played an important role in forming policies. 
The critical point of this question lies in whether or not the motivation 
of leaders can be explained from the perspective of profit maximization. 
In an ideal world of economic activity, where each participant in a market 
can get enough information to pursue his objectives, a rational process of 
decision-making can be expected. In actuality, however, entrepreneurs 
have not been able to predict exactly the result of their economic 
activities. The difficulty of prediction would have been especially 
apparent when structural changes in the economy were underway, as with 
the Industrial Revolution. The Industrial Revolution can be defined as a 
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process of innovation so wide in scope that it changed social structures. 
Keynes argues in his 1936 “The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money” that an expectation concerning events of even 5 
years ahead is not reliable.７ Putting aside political affairs, it was not so 
difficult to estimate accurately in the 1930s as it was in the period of the 
Industrial Revolution, due to the fact that the economic activity in the 
1930s was not so innovative. As Schumpeter asserts, innovators' 
motivation cannot be induced by a hedonistic approach and can be 
explained by studying subjective factors. He points out three 
motivations: “the dream and the will to found a private kingdom”; “the 
will to conquer, the impulse to fight”; and “the joy of creating, of getting 
things done.”８ 
These subjective motivations have a strong relationship with the 
difficulty of estimation of economic activity. Schumpeter compares 
economic life with military action and asserts, “As military action must be 
taken in a given strategic position even if all the data potentially 
procurable are not available, so also in economic life action must be taken 
without working out all the details of what is to be done.”９ He tries to 
examine the conditions of success from an individualistic perspective. 
Innovators' success, he argues, “depends upon intuition”, which is the 
ability to predict outcomes.10 
In circumstances of uncertainty, an innovator cannot rely upon 
information which can be defined with apparent criteria and can be gained 
without failure. As Christensen's research on the history of technological 
development reveals, even the information of a market is not enough to 
jump over a deep technological gap.11 He points out that the unexpected 
development of technology broke the surface of sustaining technology 
and ruined companies which concentrated their effort in improving 
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sustaining technology. 
“An individualistic perspective” which is chosen by Schumperter can 
be contrasted with “a social perspective.” This approach takes into 
consideration not only the innovator's ability to forecast, but also his 
ability to gain social confidence, including the sympathy of colleagues and 
subordinates. Additionally, he must gain the approval of his 
decision-making as the most appropriate policy, from a perspective of 
social need. 
Why do innovators need social confidence? Errors of estimation and 
re-arrangement of schedules are inherent in the process of innovation. 
No matter how great an innovator is, it is difficult for him to surmount an 
unexpected situation. A historical case study about such a situation will 
be introduced in the following part of this article. However, some 
theoretical points should be suggested here in an effort to clarify a social 
perspective. Even respectable leaders of entrepreneurs make errors and 
their companies go bankrupt. In such cases, the leaders' ability to 
forecast the future did not work effectively. This illustrates the fact that a 
rational approach doesn't work if predictions turn out to be false. How do 
entrepreneurs rebuild their plans after confidence in their expectations 
has broken down? If people visualize a trajectory along with rationality, 
the inability to predict efficiently can corrupt the whole system of that 
trajectory. How could people regain confidence in their decision-making? 
They should have gotten people's confidence not that a decision is 
optimal but that a decision is appropriate taking into account the 
resources and limited information. 
If a regional economy or an industry is good, it can invite capital 
investment. However, if the situation turn bad, what kind of element 
could change the trajectory of deterioration? Taub's research into 
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regional economy also prove that economic objective elements 
themselves could not change this trend and the subjective participation 
of residents is needed.12 
Finally, we will address the question of how collective action can be 
maintained to be effective. Comparing the French, German and Japanese 
cultures with those of Americans and the British, Hampden-Turner and 
Trompenaars argue that the French, Germans and Japanese “would say 
that if the needs of the group are considered first, then the invisible hand 
will . . . automatically take care of the desires of the individual.”13 This 
article, however, will illustrate the fact that even in a traditional rural 
society in Japan, an organization with communitarian policies has been 
vulnerable to a challenge from outsiders, and an enterprise without a 
strict policy to pursue its own economic objectives has been, also, 
vulnerable to economic turmoil. 
2. The Development of the Japanese Economy and the Textile Market 
2. 1 The Textile Market and the Commercial Revolution 
2. 1. 1 The Textile Market in the Period of 1890-1910 
The demand for textiles increased in the period 1890-1920. The growth 
was especially dramatic in the 1890s and 1910s, as the table “Content of 
Expenditure” illustrates. The expenditure for clothes doubled in the 1890s. 
The westernization of Japanese culture (the acceptance of European and 
North American cultures) had already begun at the time of the Meiji 
Restoration, but most Japanese people wore traditional clothing in this 
period. The expansion of the textile market allowed the traditional weaving 
industry to develop with imported or domestic materials supplied from the 
modernized production system. Japan's own Industrial Revolution 
commenced in the light industry sectors in this period. 
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Table 1 : Content of Expenditure 
(Unit: million Yen, %) 
Year Food Cloth Dwelling Total 
1890 2591 (63) 170 (4) 459 (11) 4123
1900 3254 (60) 364 (7) 558 (10) 5444
1910 3907 (60) 445 (7) 798 (12) 6513
1920 5296 (60) 780 (9) 921 (10) 8848
Source: Miyohei Shinohara, “Private expenditure: Long 
term economic statistics series no.6”, pp.138-139 
 
The department stores evolved from stores of traditional clothing, 
kimono in Japanese. One of them started to create fashion in clothing: it 
catered for upper-class demand; its fashion did not substantially affect the 
daily life of middle- and lower-class people. 
2. 1. 2 The Commercial Revolution in the Period 1910 to 1920 
The boom which took place during WWⅠ continued until the 1920s, 
affecting the consumption of clothing. It boosted the demand in volume and 
changed the content of it. The first few years of the 1900s already 
witnessed that the public taste in clothing had upgraded and diversified. 
These changes became apparent in the 1910s and continued until the late 
1920s. The westernization of clothing also started to affect the daily lives 
and the consumption of middle- and lower-class people. Silk textiles took the 
top share, replacing cotton textiles in 1920 and the share of wool textiles 
which started after the Meiji Restoration rose as high as to 20 per cent. 
 
Table 2 : The content of textile consumption in Japan 
(Unit: Yen, %) 
Year Cotton Silk Ramie Wool Rayon Total 
1908 136  121  6  29  0  292
1910 159 (44) 148 (41) 7 (2) 45 (13) 0  359
1920 543 (37) 625 (63) 21 (1) 277 (19) 2 (0) 1468
1928 544 (37) 559 (38) 23 (1) 328 (22) 26 (2) 1480
Source: The same as the table before 
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Urbanization was accelerated due to economic expansion and mass 
transportation systems; for instance, railways connecting big cities and the 
rural hinterlands made the marketing activity of department stores more 
influential. The department stores were deemed as shops for high-class 
people until around 1910. One of the stores with the highest reputation 
started a discount sale of cotton textile in the late 1910s, and other stores 
followed suit. Cotton textiles were viewed as clothes for common people. 
These stores made use of newspapers as a means of advertisement and 
attracted many customers. In comparison with the traditional relationship 
between clothing shops and neighborhood customers, the new marketing 
policy was revolutionary. 
2. 2 Entrepreneurs and Social Division in the Weaving Industry 
The weaving industry from 1890 to 1910 consisted of two types of 
manufacturers, the traditional small-sized producers and large modernized 
companies. In this article, traditional small-sized producers will be 
examined. Due to the smallness of production, they themselves could not 
undertake marketing and had little bargaining power in the purchasing of 
input materials. In a typical case, the products were sold and loaded by 
brokers or intermediate merchants in the regions where they were 
produced. Producers formed cooperatives to maintain the quality of 
products and to gain bargaining power with material suppliers. Generally 
speaking, the manufacturing system changed from a traditional putting-out 
system to an in-house production system in the period from 1890 to 1920. 
The number of weavers in the putting-out system decreased nationwide. 
There were two patterns representing that decrease. In some regions, 
the number decreased along with the same trend as the national decline; 
other regions continued to produce steadily in the 1910s and the decrease 
began later. In this article, two regions will be examined. Isesaki textile 
  浦和短期大学     浦和論叢 第 34 号 2005-6 146
 
region, located to the north of Tokyo, will be mainly examined, since it 
gives us a good example of how cooperative activities were attained and 
maintained. The putting-out system there was relatively competent and 
the decline started later. The weaving industry in Nara Prefecture-an 
example of the former case of declining-is chosen as another case study. 
Under the putting-out system, a maker was not a producer but an 
organizer of the production system. There were many part-time weavers 
organized by each maker. The role of makers, however, cannot be viewed 
only as organizers. They had to take risks: what kind of materials would be 
input, what kind of textile-such as ramie, silk or cotton-would be woven, 
what kind of patterns would be applied on textiles. 
A maker first gained yarn material and then farmed out the preparatory 
process of weaving to out-house breachers, warpers, dyers and so on. 
Prepared threads of warp and weft were distributed to the weavers' houses. 
Finished clothes were gathered later by a maker and brought to the 
arrangers' houses. 
 
Figure  Putting-out System and Flow of Products 
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2. 3 The Features of Ikat Textile 
Two weaving industry districts examined in this article were famous for 
their “ikat” textiles. The word ikat is originally a Malay word, meaning to 
tie or to bind.14 The tied part of thread remains un-dyed, and various kinds 
of patterns can be created by changing the bound part, including geometric 
patterns, flowers, animals, cattle and so on. Two methods of decorating 
cotton textile had been developed mainly in the forms of stripes and ikat. 
Ikat decoration features flexibility of patterning, while the striped 
decoration cannot draw curved lines. The word ikat is used these days to 
mean not a kind of dyeing technique but a kind of pattern.15 
Furthermore, Ikat has a long history of several hundred years during and 
after the Edo period, which started in the early 17th century and ended in 
the middle of the 19th century. To enjoy wearing ikat was an integral part 
of culture, and the Japanese developed various types of ikat. Ikat can be 
classified into two groups, dyed ikat and printed ikat. The former is named 
after the fact that thread is dyed before weaving, and the latter is printed 
after weaving. The popularity of printed ikat illustrates how much the 
Japanese people liked the traditional ikat patterns. Different kinds of 
textiles were developed using only popular patterns of ikat. It was at first 
supplied in the 1910s to meet with the basic demand for ikat. 
Dyed ikat can be classified into binding ikat and wood-pressing ikat from 
the viewpoint of how thread is kept from being dyed. In the wood-pressing 
ikat technique the un-dyed part of the thread is tightly pressed with wood. 
The wood-pressing technique to dye relatively minor parts of whole thread 
was developed in Nara. This kind of ikat was called white ikat, since most of 
the thread was un-dyed. 
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3. Isesaki Weaving Industry 16 
3. 1 Features of Isesaki Region and Isesaki Products 
3. 1. 1 Features of Isesaki Products and makers 
Isesaki had its golden age in the 1920s, producing unique silk ikat, which 
was one of the most popular silk ikat of those days. In its heyday of 
prosperity, makers issued orders to out-house part-time weavers not only 
in the Isesaki County and neighboring counties in Gunma Prefecture, but 
also in other prefectures. However, this enlarged activity was rare in the 
long history of the Isesaki silk industry during the pre-World War Ⅱ 
period. Generally speaking, Isesaki ikat products were woven by workers in 
Isesaki County. 
Isesaki County was located in Gunma prefecture, which was one of the 
main prefectures for silk yarn production. During the Edo era, the farmers 
wove silk cloth with home-made materials in a very primitive way. This 
region had a long tradition of silk weaving. However big and full-time 
makers were very few, and most makers also had income from agriculture; 
they were also landowners or big farmers. The Isesaki weaving industry 
grew from a primitive production system around the time of the Meiji 
Restoration into a well-organized, well-advertised and well-infrastructured 
regional industry. 
Gunma Prefecture is located to the north of Tokyo, and Isesaki's 
accessibility to the textile market was not as good as Nara's. This 
geographical factor worked as a leverage for leadership of big brokers and 
created strong solidarity for entrepreneurs. They produced silk ikat 
textiles and silk stripe textiles. The fabrics of the textiles were plain and 
they did not use jakard looms, with which complicated cloth such as 
Kyoto's fine kimono clothes could be woven. 
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One of the most important features of Isesaki products came from a 
material known as spun silk yarn. It was cheaper than even low-grade pure 
silk yarn. With this material, makers tried to meet the demand for 
traditional Kimono clothing from the middle- and lower-classes in Japan. 
This material led to another innovation, namely the invention of warp ikat 
produced with power-looms. The surface of spun silk yarn was nappy for 
weaving. Some inventors, however, took advantage of the character. If 
nappy yarn is dyed and ikat patterns are designed on the warp threads, the 
yarn's non-smooth surface spreads the effect of coloring in narrow spaces. 
It supplements the vague patterns of warp ikat, and the warp ikat with spun 
yarn resembles that of double ikat17 on which complicated patterns can be 
woven. Owing to this technology entrepreneurs at Isesaki could produce 
silk ikat textiles by power looms. The cost remained low, but the clothing 
resembles that of double ikats. It was another factor to widen the market to 
suit the demands of the lower classes. 
3. 1. 2 Movement of residents for regional development 
The Isesaki region had a tradition of social movement for its citizens. 
After the Meiji Restoration, people asked the Emperor's government to 
establish a national parliament. From a nationwide perspective the 
movement appeared political; however, Isesaki people emphasized 
economic development as a condition of people's power. They tried various 
economic activities as well as political activities. They strengthened social 
bonds through these activities. After the liberal movement, some people 
became businessmen, one a bureaucrat of the local government and 
another a mayor of Isesaki. An informal bond including entrepreneurs, 
politicians and intellectuals was formed. A famous socialist was invited by a 
local socialist to the office building of entrepreneurs' cooperatives to make 
a speech; an act proved that how very tolerant citizens were to different 
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opinions.18 
3. 2 Outline of Development of Isesaki Weaving Industry 
3. 2. 1 Transformation from Sustenance Economy to Market-oriented Economy 
Farmers had already produced silk textile in the Edo era when farmers' 
market-oriented activity was severely restricted by feudalistic rulers who 
wanted farmers to remain in a self-sustenance economy. After the Meiji 
Restoration, various restrictions of economic activity were lifted, and the 
rural economy was stimulated. Isesaki was located in a region of one of the 
most important sericultural industries. It is reported that a 
manufacturer-farmer used his own regional silk or silk yarn. 
The economic activity of manufacturers was accelerated under the 
inflationary monetary policy taken by the Meiji government which issued 
huge amounts of notes to fund the suppression of a revolt by the old 
samurai class. In this situation manufacturers were, it was reported, 
enticed to produce larger amounts of products with low quality. 
Deterioration of quality resulted from another factor: they did not know the 
appropriate usage of synthetic dyers, which they had just begun to use. 
After the long period of the “closed door” policy of the shogunate 
government was abolished, materials for the textile industry, such as dyers 
and thread started to be imported. 
Entrepreneurs operating in the Isesaki region formed a producers' 
association in a bid to maintain product quality in the 1880s. The famous 
entrepreneur Yaichiro Shimojyo, who was then a manufacturer, took the 
leadership of the organization, and it succeeded in improving the quality of 
products and got a prize in an industrial exhibition. The central 
government held such exhibitions to accelerate the Japanese economy in 
those days. 
In the 1890s some manufacturers tried to adopt spun silk yarn instead of 
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low-grade pure silk yarn. Spun silk yarn came from bad cocoons. The 
thread of bad cocoons were short; in contrast to the normal long thread 
used by silk manufacturers. The cotton spinning industry was being 
modernized at that time, and the technology was transferred to other fields. 
Adoption of spun silk yarn can be estimated as one type of innovation 
defined by Schumpeter,19 although the production system itself remained 
traditional. Short threads of silk were spun into yarn. Spun silk yarn was 
cheaper than low-grade pure silk yarn; however it had some problems. 
Firstly, it was not as lustrous as silk yarn. Secondly, it was so fluffy that a 
hand-loom operation was more laborious than in the case of pure silk yarn. 
An influential group of merchants in Kyoto made the criticism that 
clothes made of spun silk were worse even than those made of both silk and 
cotton, and they easily deformed. Therefore, the leader of the cooperative, 
Shimojyo, tried to prohibit their introduction. Conversely, another leader 
of the cooperative, Morimura, asserted that the criticism of Kyoto 
merchants was influenced by the hostility of manufacturers in Kyoto. The 
low-price spun silk products badly affected them. He argued that Isesaki 
manufacturers should be cautious in their criticism. The difference of 
opinions split the cooperative into two groups, and a new cooperative was 
founded by Morimura's group. 
It is very difficult to judge which opinion was right. Isesaki makers, it was 
reported, began to produce mainly summer clothes in later years. Summer 
clothes can be thinner than those for winter. There was the possibility that 
producers were not so familiar with the feature of the spun silk yarn, an 
innovative material at that time, that their products invited consumers' 
criticism. 
After the two cooperatives were reunited by the efforts of the politician 
who was once a member of the liberal movement and other people in the 
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region, the cooperative adopted spun silk as an officially-recognized 
material. 
Among regions where medium- and small-sized manufacturers produced 
traditional silk clothes, the Isesaki region emerged as one of the most 
important. Isesaki goods featured well-designed and low-priced products. 
They could meet the demand of the laborer class, whose standards of living 
were improved as the Japanese economy expanded rapidly. 
Around 1910 makers aggressively tried another textile made of both 
cotton and silk. They had a good model region, the neighboring Ashikaga 
region. As spun silk could widen the demand of Isesaki products in the 
middle and lower classes, entrepreneurs, we suppose, expected that new 
less expensive commodities would be welcomed by those users. One of the 
reports about regional textile industries proved their optimistic 
expectation. However, while the neighboring region could keep the volume 
of the production relatively high even in the recession around 1910, Isesaki 
makers failed in maintain standards, and production decreased sharply. 
This failure illustrates the difficulty there was in estimating the adoption of 
new technologies correctly. 
3. 2. 2 Heydays of Isesaki Weaving Industry 
As manufacturers adopted power-looms around 1910, the problem of 
over-production became serious due to the long stagnation between the 
rapid expansions caused by the Russo-Japanese War and World War Ⅰ. 
The financial situation of entrepreneurs in the weaving industry became 
worse, and some companies went bankrupt. During World War Ⅰ, the 
Japanese economy attained a fortunate expansion, owing to the sudden 
decrease of competition in the international and domestic markets. Many 
people of the middle-class became affluent enough to buy more expensive 
clothes. It was reported that the taste in clothes among Japanese upgraded 
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in the period of this expansion. During the boom, Isesaki products were 
criticized by some retailers because the quality was not as good as that of 
other textile industry regions, and the cause of the low evaluation was 
attributed to the spun silk material. Despite this bad reputation, some 
entrepreneurs tried the power-loom production of warp ikat textile of spun 
silk. 
The Japanese economy suffered a deep recession in 1920, and the 
expansion slowed down considerably. With the expectation of a continuing 
boom, many producers in the weaving industry had extended production 
capacity. Additionally, the Kanto earthquake hit the capital and its vicinity, 
causing huge casualties and economic damage. It was reported that a 
movement toward simplifying life started as a result of this situation. The 
trend to upgrade cloth consumption turned conversely to one of 
downgrading. Isesaki products were recommended by people who 
supported the movement, and they became the most popular among 
traditional silk clothes. There were two major weaving districts in the 
northern part of the Kanto Plain, Kiryu and Ashikaga. Many makers started 
to adopt power-looms during the boom economy. Following the increase in 
production capacity, there occurred the collapse of the boom and the 
Kanto earthquake. The makers found there was not a big enough market to 
absorb their products. Entrepreneurs at Isesaki ordered the makers 
belonging to other cooperatives to weave clothes with the Isesaki brand. 
3. 3 Entrepreneurs and Workers 
3. 3. 1 Production System and Makers 
The Isesaki weaving industry was in the process of transformation from 
semi self-support production to market-oriented production in the 1880s 
and 1890s. The social division of production resulted in the cooperation of 
many kinds of out-house workers and subcontractors. 
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A maker issued orders to breachers, warpers, dyers and weavers. He 
himself played a central role as an organizer and a risk-taker in this 
economic activity. Isesaki's entrepreneurs enlarged the market for 
traditional Japanese clothing by supplying relatively cheap commodities. 
Although Isesaki textiles were relatively cheap compared to high-grade 
expensive textiles, such as Nishigin textiles made in Kyoto, silk textiles 
themselves were not necessities but luxuries. The implication was that if 
products did not please people's tastes, they could not be sold well. 
Makers tried to develop good designs and new fabrics of weaving. They had 
already gotten a reputation for clothes with good designs in the early 1910s. 
As outlined in section 2. 2, the change of clothing fashion became apparent 
in the 1910s. Manufacturers had to forecast the coming trend of people's 
taste in popular patterns and colors. On this basis, they had to prepare 
production. As table prices of two textiles illustrates, the trend of prices of 
textiles differed from each other. Another material from the Shimjyo 
Archive illustrates that it was very difficult to anticipate the result of 
production. Even if the trend line of prices seems to be declining over a 
long term perspective, the financial data shows that the profit of the deals 
of each market day differed and were unpredictable. 
Shimojyo Archive also tells us that the content of production of the first 
quarter of 1914 and that of the first quarter of 1919 were quite different. 
Makers had to select textiles flexibly in accordance with demand and price. 
Even if makers knew the general trends of the textile market, they could 
not always estimate the price trend of each textile exactly. 
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Table 3 : Prices of two Textiles 
(Unit: Yen) 
Year/ 
Month 
a stripe a warp ikat
1914/1 8.5  10.5
1915/1 5.19 9.8
source: Shimojyo Archive 
 
The cost of silk as material accounted for about 60 - 70 percent of 
production cost. Therefore, the silk weaving industry was vulnerable to the 
fluctuation of silk prices. If a maker could prepare silk yarn at a low price 
and could sell his products on the upward trend of prices, he could gain 
huge profits, and vice versa. 
Most weavers were supplied by farmers' families. One of the local history 
books describes that wives and daughters worked hard since they didn't 
know other opportunities for working.20 However, the migration of labor 
was an active feature in this sericultural region. We can suppose that 
farmers got information of the regional labour market. other One of the 
traditions says that if a family has three daughters, it can build a big 
warehouse. The farmers selected part-time weaving jobs in accordance 
with the man-power available in their homes. 
3. 3. 2 Marketing System and Brokers 
Most Isesaki silk textiles were handled by brokers who had a central 
office or a branch office at Isesaki. Three famous textile regions had 
developed in Gunma Prefecture and the neighboring prefecture, Tochigi. In 
these regions there had been a unique marketing system since the Edo era. 
While dealers took risks by buying and selling commodities, brokers never 
took their own risks and only charged a brokerage fee when a contract was 
reached between a maker and a wholesaler. This functional distinction 
among marketing facilities was done only from a theoretical perspective. In 
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the real management of brokers, they dealt with commodities at their own 
risk. 
One of the features of the Isesaki marketing system was that most 
products were handled by brokers, while only a half of ikat products were 
dealt with by dealers in Nara. The market was well-organized at Isesaki. It 
was held six days a month, and products or samples were displayed in each 
broker's section of the market.  
There were some influential broker houses which could execute an 
oligopolistic power in the market. One of the historical documents, 
describing the relationship between makers and brokers at Kiryu and 
Aishikaga markets, says that makers were like the vassals of a broker in an 
age of feudalism. On the other hand, another document asserts that 
makers and brokers were mutually different to the extent that a bond 
among them seemed not to exist. Therefore, the relationship is a 
controversial point. 
One aspect which showed the strong relationship between them is the 
loan given to makers by brokers. Although loans were common at Isesaki, 
the documents of a management meeting which was held at the central 
office of a major broker reveal in the early 1910s that they tried to stop this 
kind of loan. The same document also shows evidence that they could not 
abolish this kind of loan to makers. 
Some of the maker's archives will be introduced in this article as 
evidence of a risky feature of makers' management. The table shows to 
what degree the financial position of makers fluctuated. The Japanese 
economy suffered a short period of recession in 1920 after the conspicuous 
expansion of the late 1910s. Shimojyo tried to expand production but found 
the market too weak to sell products at profitable prices. Makers used to 
stock materials and products by gaining loans from banks and brokers. 
Hisami Matsuzaki Cooperatives in the Traditional Weaving Industry and their Leaders 157
Shimojyo increased debts and assets at the end of 1920. As table 2 shows, 
his debts exceeded his assets. If the market remained weak, the financial 
situation would become desperate. The next figure shows how drastically 
his debt changed around 1920. This sudden increase in debt resulting from 
using products and materials as collateral illustrates the risky feature of 
makers' management. 
Fortunately, the recession did not hit the Isesaki industry so hard, and 
Isesaki textiles were sold at good prices. Brokers extended loans to 
Shimojyo, but it was very risky considering that Isesaki suffered severe 
losses and some makers including the Simojyo family went bankrupt about 
twenty years previous. 
 
Table 4 : Asset and Debt of Shimojyo 
(Unit: Thousand Yen) 
Term Asset Debt Net Asset Variation
1920 Second Half. 298 307 -9 
1921 First Half. 296 222 74 +83  
1921 Second Half. 335 243 82 +8  
1922 First Half. 331 245 86 +4  
Source : Shimojyo Archive 
 
Due to the oligopolistic market structure and strong financial position, 
an assumption that brokers got a huge oligopolistic profit was deduced.21 
The same broker left other documents which show how much profit or loss 
a dealer of the broker gained or lost at each deal. These documents tell 
that even if a high ranking official dealt with a transaction, he could not 
always gain a profit. 
There was a possibility that brokers adopted the maximization of profit 
not from a short-run perspective but from a long-run perspective. Can 
these two perspectives be comparable in the same structure of 
decision-making? People in Isesaki described the risky management of 
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makers in the following expression: a maker cannot continue operation for 
three generations. Many makers went bankrupt as the textile industry 
fluctuated. Long-term policy did not guarantee success. Consequently, 
such policy might produce no fruit and brokers' loans to makers became 
soured. The intention to maximize profits from a long term perspective 
came from a subjective expectation rather than objective estimation. 
The major brokers in the Isesaki market employed another policy of 
long-term perspective. Raising the reputation of Isesaki's products for 
good fashion and good quality was a common goal for brokers. Owners of 
brokerage houses were often chosen as chairmen of the cooperative, and 
they played an important role in carrying out production policy in this 
region. Makers themselves were hopeful of establishing fame as makers. 
Through their efforts, the region might gain a good reputation. However, 
they were inherently competitive with each other, and it would be difficult 
to compromise differences concerning marketing policies among makers. 
The difficulty was illustrated by the conflict in the 1890s concerning the 
introduction of spun silk yarn. Brokers had other interests in establishing a 
regional brand. Their profits depended upon the volume of Isesaki products 
they dealt with. Additionally, information concerning the textile market 
was more accessible to brokers than makers. 
The supply of textiles increased after many weaving regions adopted 
power-loom production systems. There was a bad tradition that a retailer 
returned commodities to wholesalers, asserting various excuses, and the 
wholesaler, in turn, returned commodities to makers. A 1917 document of 
the major brokerage house which operated Kiryu and Ashikaga regions also 
revealed that the Isesaki branch sent back many commodities returned by 
wholesalers and the percentage of returned commodities was 3.2%, the 
lowest-compared to 5.8% and 5.1% for Kiryu and Ashikaga, respectively. 
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Some brokers at Isesaki held strong attitudes towards wholesalers. 
In the early 1920s, a broker who once operated a branch and retreated 
from the Isesaki market during the severe recession around 1910 tried to 
reopen his branch at Isesaki. Entrepreneurs adopted various policies to 
improve the quality and raised the reputation of Isesaki as explained in 
detail in the following section. Therefore, most entrepreneurs, it can be 
supposed, had hostility toward the broker. Some entrepreneurs were firmly 
against his reopening. However, judging by the articles of a local 
newspaper, they could not theorize the legitimacy of their rejection. 
People at Isesaki could hardly deny the right of economic freedom which, 
the broker insisted, was a basic right given to people by the constitution of 
the Meiji regime. He threatened that he would make a petition to one of 
the highest ranking officials in the central government. In this situation, 
entrepreneurs could only criticize the legitimacy of the procedure of 
opening and could not reject the opening itself. Some people welcomed him, 
pointing out the fact that newcomers would make the town more prosperous. 
Through their efforts during the recession in the first half of the 1910s, 
entrepreneurs accumulated an invisible stock of know-how to cope with 
the changing demands and to enhance their good reputation to compete 
with other textile regions. Their failure to guard their unique invisible stock, 
which was commonly owned by entrepreneurs and used freely, illustrated 
the vulnerability of regionalism to the economic freedom beyond regions.22 
3. 3. 3 Financial System and Bankers 
Entrepreneurs issued promissory notes as means of payments. A huge 
amount of notes was issued at the following transactions, between a maker 
and yarn merchants, between a broker and a maker, and between a 
wholesaler and a broker. A maker prepared weaving materials, and ordered 
weaving and arranging all the year round. Most transactions were made at 
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the market within a few months. There was, in turn, a long interval between 
the input of running capital such as materials and wages, and the collection 
of capital as promissory notes. Most entrepreneurs did not have enough 
capital to wait for this interval of capital circulation and had to depend 
upon loans supplied by banks and brokers. 
The fact that the brokers at the Isesaki market dealt mostly with 
regional products meant the huge amount of capital had to be supplied by 
the entrepreneurs themselves and by financial institutions. Additionally, 
the geographical drawback of Isesaki-that it was located far away from the 
central marketing cities-increased the dependence upon regional banks. 
Makers at Isesaki could not depend upon wholesalers financially. Most 
promissory notes were discounted by banks, and makers could collect 
input capital. Local banks later collected notes from wholesalers far from 
Isesaki. It was reported that the notes issued by wholesalers could not be 
discounted without the endorsement of major brokers.23 
There were a few local banks which supplied funds to textile 
entrepreneurs. In 1900 a new bank called Gunma Commercial Bank was 
established by the efforts of a group of entrepreneurs. One of the leaders 
was Mr. Shimojyo. Most paid-up capital was supplied by Isesaki people; 
however it was under the control of one of the Yasuda Zaibatsu family 
members. Yasuda sent a manager and the leader of the zaibatsu was 
appointed as an advisor with the right to veto decisions of the bank's board. 
It is supposed that entrepreneurs had already known the seasonal 
fluctuation of capital demand, and huge amounts of money had to be input 
into the regional industry by borrowing from other financial institutions. 
A document of the board meeting of Gunma Commercial Bank reveals 
another anecdote about when the family of Shimojyo, who was the leader of 
the industry, nearly went bankrupt. During the recession after the end of 
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the Russo-Japanese war, Mr. Shimojyo ran a manufacturing division and a 
brokerage division. His brokerage division, it was supposed, suffered a 
huge loss due to a soured loan to makers. The advisor of the bank asserted 
that a principle of banking should be carried out: the bank should let 
Shimojyo become delinquent and should not bail out his management. Local 
members of the board took a different attitude. For them the top priority 
should be put on development of the regional economy and bailing out 
Shimojyo was substantially important. They resisted the bank's strict 
policy toward Shomojyo. Eventually, the bank allowed a long term 
repayment plan and promised to continue financing his brokerage division 
on the condition of endorsement by a local member of the board, Mr. 
Tokue. Consequently, the bank adopted lenient policy toward other 
makers. Mr. Tokue was one of the leaders of the political movement in the 
first half of the Meiji Era. 
Another controversy was provoked among board members a few years 
later. Mr. Tokue was asked for more commitment endorsing promissory 
notes issued by broker house Shimojyo, which was then operated 
independently by his son. On this occasion too, local members, including a 
politician-turned businessman cooperated to ease the condition of 
endorsement. 
Gunma Commercial Bank played an indispensable role as a financial 
institution along with another old local bank, Isesaki Bank. Isesaki Bank 
was established in 1888, gathering money which had been stocked in the 
region, and the board consisted of textile brokers, merchants and a banker. 
The board members were all residents at Isesaki or neighboring villages. 
The first head official of the bank was a man of wealth in the region and was 
once elected as a member of the upper house of the national parliament. 
Later he started managing a brokerage house. This anecdote showed 
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Isesaki's heritage that people thought the political situation of local people 
could be improved through economic development and people could 
cooperate for this purpose. 
This heritage badly affected the policy of banking later. A banker 
replying to our interview witnesses that the attitude of Isesaki Bank toward 
clients was too lenient. In the 1920s, the financial position deteriorated 
due to the accumulation of lands. The lands were once collateral; after 
loans became soured, the bank wase obliged to own such lands. After 
financial turmoil in the late 1920s, many regional banks lost confidence in 
clients and were forced to merge. When Isesaki Bank was merged, the price 
of stock was valued low and share holders in the region suffered losses. 
3. 5 Cooperative and Leaders 
Isesaki silk textiles were supplied by many small- and medium-sized 
makers. The organizations of makers at traditional textile regions with 
many small producers had the common objective of improving and 
maintaining the quality of products. The solidarity of entrepreneurs at 
Isesaki made the activities of its cooperative broader and more aggressive 
than those of other organizations. The cooperative which was officially 
registered in 1886 had its origin in the establishment of the Association of 
Isesaki Thick-Yarn Textile.24 
After the opening of the Japanese market, dye materials began to be 
imported. At first dyers were unfamiliar with them and the quality of 
textiles deteriorated. The association chose an appropriate method of 
production and adopted strict rules. Special threads had to be woven into 
textiles to show that it was an Isesaki product. Two years later, another 
device was introduced to assure quality: a tag with sizes of textile and a 
producer's name had to be put at the end of each cloth. 
The cooperative adopted other policies in an effort to improve quality 
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and to accelerate invention of new textiles during its early history. Among 
those policies, the most difficult and budget-consuming one was to run a 
textile laboratory, which distributed new technology of dyeing among 
entrepreneurs and undertook experiments concerning dyeing. When funds 
for running the laboratory were borrowed from a local government, Mr. 
Shimojyo's private assets were used as collateral and the return of the debt 
became one of the main issues for the cooperative around 1890. 
The cooperative was forced to introduce more aggressive policies during 
the severe recession of the early 1910s. It started a competition of silk 
products, in which makers competed with each other, and they invited 
officials of wholesalers and department stores to this competition as 
examiners. Entrepreneurs could know the demand of the market through 
the decision of prize-winners and examiners' comments on products. The 
cooperative carried out another event, an inspection tour to the Osaka and 
Kyoto area. Participants knew the market demand through direct 
observation and this event led, it was reported, to the cooperative's 
decision to abolish silk-cotton mixed textiles, the implementation of strict 
inspection rules and the development of new designs. 
As a result of these efforts the brand name of Isesaki products became 
established in the textile market, and in the 1920s they enjoyed a good 
economic standing, while neighboring weaving regions suffered a severe 
recession. 
3. 3. 4 Fate of Leaders 
The cooperative owed its development to two famous leaders, Shimojyo 
and Morimura. Their fates became a good litmus paper test for what kind of 
theory can best explain leaders' decision-making. 
Morimura tried to adopt an innovative material of spun-silk as one of 
yarn. The prosperity of the Isesaki industry in the 1910s and 1920s came 
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from the adoption of this material. He also introduced a refined hand-loom 
and contributed to the transformation from the traditional hand-loom 
system to the power-loom system. However, he was ruined by the 
recession around 1900 and could not enjoy the fruit of own efforts. 
The other leader, Shimojyo, contributed very much to the industry; he 
was very eager at organizing social institutions and improve regional 
infrastructure from entrepreneurs' perspectives such as the cooperatives, 
banks, brokerage activities, and so on. When Morimura was ruined, he was 
also on the brink of bankruptcy. A local politician and businessmen 
cooperated to be lenient to Shimojyo. Through his long history of activity, 
he developed s social network and this invisible asset worked to bail out his 
company. 
Even prominent leaders could not predict their fortune. We can suppose 
they would have tried to maximize their objectives on the basis of their 
philosophy or to optimize their input to attain their objectives. In the real 
world, they could not rely upon their own estimations alone. They had to 
rely upon mutual trust and cooperation among local residents.  
3. 3. 5 Collapse of Mutual Trust 
Mutual trust and cooperation had been a part of Isesaki's helitage. 
However, the expansion of production using subcontractors outside of 
Isesaki destroyed this tradition. Newcomers who had learned the 
management technique from existing makers were welcomed generously. A 
maker could easily increase production using outside power-loom factories. 
He didn't need to maintain good relations with neighboring subcontractors 
and weavers. Even a newcomer could make use of the regional brand 
without paying a special fee. The increased supply changed the market 
balance; the bargaining position of Isesaki entrepreneurs became weak. A 
huge volume of products began to be returned after being sent to the 
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markets by brokers. In the late 1920s, the financial situation of the 
entrepreneurs turned bad, notwithstanding the fact that the volume traded 
in the Isesaki market was recorded as the highest in the pre- WWⅡ period. 
Makers gradually got frustrated at the distribution system managed by 
brokers. Their frustration culminated in 1932 in a new cooperative 
organization which excluded brokers. The imitation of new products 
became endemic among makers. Morality and trust collapsed almost entirely. 
4. Nara Weaving Industry 
4. 1 Outline of the History of the Industry 
Nara prefecture used to be one of the most important cotton textile 
regions.25 One of the statistics gathered by the Meiji Restoration 
government showed that cotton textile produced in Nara accounted for 
4.6% of the total Japanese output in volume and 6.4% in value. It shared 
second place with Osaka, following the famous textile prefecture Aichi.26 
There were two forms of production system in Nara, a small-sized 
factory with tools and manual labor, and a putting-out system organizing 
labor with its own hand-looms. The latter was supposed to be a main 
production system.27 
The production systems in some light industries were modernized 
drastically in the period from 1890 to 1910. Osaka and Aichi Prefectures 
could boast the same level of market share as Nara, and the two 
prefectures successfully transformed the industry from the handloom 
putting-out production to the power-loom in-house production in the 
period. Unlike the other main textile regions, Nara failed to keep pace with 
the industrial revolution. Furthermore it failed to change a traditional 
putting-out system into a more market-oriented one. 
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3. 2 Features of Products 
3. 2. 1 Main Cotton Textile 
Main cotton textiles produced in Nara were classified by patterns: 
non-colored cloth, striped cloth, and ikat cloth. These three textiles had 
been produced under different market situations. The production of striped 
cloth decreased sharply in the period 1890 to 1910, and that of non-color 
cloth remained stagnant. Other weaving districts started to introduce 
power-looms producing these two kinds of textiles. On the other hand, the 
output of ikat cotton textile increased until 1910, and it became the 
principal textile in Nara. 
 
Table 5 : Cotton textiles in Nara 
(Unit: 100 Tan (volume), 100 Yen (value)) 
Non-color Cotton Ikat Cotton Stripe Cotton 
Year 
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value 
1900 4,445 1,377 858 999 517 316
1910 3,662 1,242 941 1,592 143 147
Source: The Statistics of Nara Prefecture 
 
As explained in section 2, there were two kinds of ikat, binding ikat and 
wood-pressing ikat. Since indigo was used to dye thread blue, the former 
kind of ikat was also called “Kon Kasuri” (blue ikat). The latter was called 
“Shiro Kasuri” (white ikat). 
There were three famous districts where blue ikat was produced: Nara, 
Iyo in Ehime Prefecture and Kurume in Fukuoka Prefecture. The latter two 
districts were located far away from the main clothing markets, in Tokyo 
and Osaka. They could enforce the strict rule that makers could use only 
natural indigo. Their products were estimated higher than those of Nara. 
The white ikat was produced with a dyeing technique by which wood with 
patterns was used to keep the thread un-dyed when it was dipped into the 
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coloring. The fixed cost of wood-pressing was higher than that of the 
binding technique, due to the process of curving patterns on wood. On the 
other hand, the variable cost could be kept low for the dyeing process. 
This method of resist dyeing would be more efficient the larger the un-dyed 
part was and the bigger a product unit was. As Table 6 illustrates, the price 
of white ikat was cheaper than that of blue ikat. 
 
Table 6 : Production of ikat cotton textile 
(Unit: 100 Tan, 100 Yen) 
1903 1911 
 
Volume Value Yen/Tan Volume Value Yen/Tan
Blue ikat 574 756 1.32 1,224 1,788 1.46 
White ikat 422 353 0.84 633 771 1.22 
Source: Nara Prefecture Management Archive and “Nara Shinbun (newspaper)”, 
1912, 6, 13 
 
Both white and blue ikats of Nara were marketed for the demand of 
relatively lower-grade clothing. This feature of the Nara ikat industry was 
effective during the period 1890-1910, when the market expanded among 
the laborer class, which grew along with the Industrial Revolution in Japan. 
The boom caused by WWⅠ changed people's demand for clothing. The 
demand was upgraded, and the fashion which department stores tried to 
create began to affect the middle- and lower-classes in Japan. 
 
Table 7 : Average Price of Ikat Products 
(Unit: Yen/Tan, as of 1920) 
Prefecture Average Price 
Nara 3.9 
Ehime 4.4 
Fukuoka 8.6 
Shizuoka 2.5 
Source: Statistics of The Ministry of  
Agriculture and Commerce 
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Additionally, other weaving districts started to supply clothes with 
printed ikat patterns. Prices of such products were almost half of Nara 
products. The competitiveness of the Nara ikat cotton textile in the 
lower-end of the market waned under these circumstances. 
4. 3 Entrepreneurs and Workers 
4. 3. 1 Production System 
Most of Nara cotton textiles were produced by a putting-out system. 
Although some factories started to employ power-looms, the relative 
number remained small. A maker owned only one loom as an in-house loom, 
and there were approximately 52 out-house looms per maker as of 1905, 
according to an official statistic.28 
The social division of the production system has already been described 
in section 2. A feature of Nara was that a maker organized only part-time 
weavers and there were no power-loom factories controlled by small 
makers. Most weavers were part-time workers provided by farmers' 
families. The seasonal fluctuation of the labor supply was unavoidable due 
to agricultural production. During the period from 1890 to 1910, the main 
crops in Nara were rice and wheat. Rice was planted in paddy fields in June 
and harvested in October. Most farmers were very busy during those 
months, while there was plenty of idle labor in other months. A maker often 
paid a wage of unit 8 Tans to laborers in advance to secure weaving. There 
was a manuscript of the cooperative's regulation which tried to prohibit a 
maker from issuing a new order if a weaver had already accepted another 
maker's order with advanced payment. The advanced payment was deemed 
as a kind of loan to weavers and an important means to assure completion 
of weaving. Weavers' houses were usually far from the makers' offices, and 
part-time weavers were not under the direct control of makers. 
There were, it was reported, some problems with this putting-out 
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system. To maintain the quality of textiles was of critical importance. Also, 
a maker would let part-time workers weave as fast as possible in order to 
run his invested capital smoothly and produce the goods on schedule. 
Generally speaking, textile products are subject to seasonal fashion. If the 
completion of weaving was late for the market, there was the possibility of 
devaluation of the products. When the demand for agricultural labor was 
strong, it was very difficult to release farmers' wives and daughters for 
weaving tasks despite their being urgently required. 
The agriculture of the region changed drastically during the 1910s. The 
development of big cities enlarged the market, and the production of 
vegetables and fruits increased. The area in which those crops were 
produced remained relatively small. But the productivity was a few times 
larger than that of rice fields and those crops consumed labor more than 
rice cultivation did. Due to this change in the agricultural economy, the 
management of organizing part-time weavers became difficult for makers. 
4. 3. 2 Marketing System 
Nara was located next to two of the three major marketing centers in 
Japan, Osaka and Kyoto. Osaka, to the west of Nara Prefecture, had 
developed its marketing system since the Edo era and became the national 
center of commodity flow. It had important wholesale merchants, and its 
population grew fast due to the expansion of light industry, such as the 
spinning industry, which was in the process of modernization in those days. 
Similarly, Kyoto, to the north of Nara Prefecture, had influential cloth 
merchants. Nara had good access to the consumers' market. Due to this, 
makers did not need to rely upon brokers in the region. About a half of all 
colored cotton textiles were sold directly to the wholesalers at market 
centers. Financial data from a famous maker shows that he borrowed 
money from a wholesaler in Osaka.29 
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On the other hand, most non-colored cotton textiles were sold through 
the hands of brokers in Nara. Some small-scale makers used to barter their 
products for yarn with the brokers. Makers who lacked sufficient capital 
chose low-price and low-quality yarn in this exchange, and the quality of 
the products, in turn, was bad.30 
Colored cotton textiles, especially ikat textiles, were not so 
problematical as non-colored textiles. The fact that such relatively 
lucrative commodities escaped being handled by neighboring wholesalers 
meant that their capital accumulation was substantially inhibited. The 
commission rate of dealers in Nara was higher than in marketing center 
cities. Therefore, competent makers sold their products directly to the 
market. 
4. 3. 3 Financial System 
The market for traditional cloth was susceptible to seasonal demands as 
explained in the former section. As an organizer of production, a maker 
issued promissory notes to acquire the necessary funds for his operation. 
Some of the big dealers, which dealt with yarn too, gave loans to makers 
not by loaning the running capital, but by lending the yarn material. 
Financial institutions played an important role in such situations. 
There were seven banks which operated financial services to the weaving 
industry around 1910. Among them, Yagi Bank, it was reported, played the 
most important role. It was established in 1894, putting together the 
capital of entrepreneurs and landowners. The manager of the bank was a 
famous entrepreneur who operated a power-loom factory for the first time 
in Nara Prefecture, and he was one of seven members of the board. The 
board included other entrepreneurs, a maker who started his cotton textile 
manufacturing business before the Meiji Restoration, and a dyer. Yagi Bank 
increased branches and paid-up capital until 1910. Financially speaking, 
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entrepreneurs in Nara apparently performed as well as those in the Isesaki 
region. 
4. 4 Activity of Cooperative 
In 1878, some producers tried to organize makers' cooperatives which 
catered for some parts of the weaving area in Nara Prefecture. They made 
their own rules concerning the textiles' quality; they hired inspectors and 
let them survey factories. However, this attempt failed due to the lack of 
penalty which could compel members to obey the cooperative's rules. 
An exhibition of Nara Ikat was held in 1882. Some leaders attempted to 
consolidate entrepreneurs concerned, and resolutions which included how 
to improve quality and how to organize a cooperative were announced in 
the same year. The following year the Cooperative of Nara Cotton Industry 
was established. It covered a wide area of Nara Prefecture and consisted of 
both makers and dealers. 
Leaders of the cooperative planned to employ an inspection system to 
improve the quality of products. However, the cooperative encountered 
sabotage by many members from the beginning of its activity. The leaders 
also tried to abolish the usage of low-grade dye material. This attempt met 
with strong resistance from dyers who had stockpiled a huge amount of 
prohibited materials. Additionally, the cooperative had a financial problem. 
It had to charge member fees in order to run the inspection system. Only a 
few members voluntarily paid fees. The cooperative could not gather the 
necessary funds and was forced to make the standard of quality so low after 
a few years that there was no resistance among members and no 
improvement of the quality. 
In 1886, one of the enthusiastic leaders proposed a stamp system, by 
which a member would put a stamp on the surface of each piece of cloth. 
The cooperative would sell stamps at varying fees, depending on the 
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quality of cloth. By this plan, the cooperatives could attain two objectives: 
the improvement of quality and high financial standing. His proposal was 
approved at the autumnal general meeting of the cooperative. 
Notwithstanding his enthusiasm, hostility towards the new system became 
insurmountable. 
The leaders tried to use the influential power of a local government and 
asked a bureaucrat to persuade members to accept the new system. The 
general meeting did not lead to an outburst of activity however; instead it 
turned into turmoil and two leaders had to run away from the arena of the 
meeting, afraid for their lives. Consequently, the leaders failed to employ a 
financial system to run the cooperative and to maintain the quality of 
products. Eventually, a bureaucrat of the highest rank in the local 
government ordered entrepreneurs to prepare a regulation, which became 
effective in 1894. The next year the cooperative adopted a strict policy to 
enforce the new regulations, and more than 100 members were put into 
custody or fined. 
Despite these efforts of the leaders and bureaucrats, the Nara Cotton 
Cooperative failed to operate an inspection system and maintain the 
quality of products. One of the makers pointed out that non-qualified 
products were mixed in with qualified ones before being sold. When leaders 
of the cooperative were forced to resign in 1926, their opponents 
demanded that the strict inspection system be loosened. As with the 
strong resistance of the 1890s, opposition continued even in the 1920s. 
5. Conclusion 
An empirical case study of two regions has been done in this article. The 
Isesaki region shows a model of communitarian capitalism. On the other 
hand, Nara illustrated how difficult it is to attain collective action among 
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inherently self-motivated entrepreneurs. 
An author of the history of the Nara Cotton Cooperative described the 
failure of various attempts, strongly indignant at the selfish behavior of 
entrepreneurs. However, selfishness itself is inherent to market-oriented 
economy. The question to be addressed is why Isesaki succeeded in 
attaining entrepreneurs' cooperation and what facilitated the cooperation. 
Nara had a longer history of the weaving industry and many makers 
scattered over a wider area than Isesaki. Additionally, Nara had better 
access to the textile market. For makers in Nara, the benefits of a 
cooperative were not so great as for makers in Isesaki. Targeting the 
products down-market probably had an adverse effect on makers' 
estimation of the efficacy of quality improvement. Two geographical 
aspects of Isesaki worked positively to facilitate the cooperation. Without 
cooperation, medium- or small-sized enterprises far from the markets 
might have found it very difficult to survive the competition. The benefits 
of cooperation were estimated relatively high in Isesaki, and as an emerging 
small region, the cost of cooperation was relatively less. However, those 
factors could not explain entirely the success of cooperation in Isesaki. 
The inherent difficulty of compromise among entrepreneurs and 
unpredictability of economic activity resulted in non-economic factors 
facilitating collective actions. 
Isesaki residents had traditionally put high priority on economic 
activities, and even a politician participated in brokerage management. 
There was a possibility of the cooperative falling apart; and a possibility of 
Shimojyo's bankruptcy. Tradition facilitated mutual trust and encouraged a 
policy of compromise to cope with problems. That tradition can be termed 
as social stock. 
After observing a long history of risky management, it might be difficult 
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to suppose that an entrepreneur could rely upon his own predictions. In the 
real world of economy, most entrepreneurs are forced to revise initial plans 
and rebuild confidence toward their own decision-making. The failures of 
two leaders of the Isesaki weaving industry illustrated this difficulty. The 
fate of Morimura, who contributed much to the development of the Isesaki 
weaving industry, shows that even prominent entrepreneurs went bankrupt 
without reaping the benefits of their efforts. Selfishness cannot be 
criticized if this risky feature of economic activities is taken into 
consideration. Maximizing one's own profits and attaining free hand 
without restriction must be quite normal in this situation. 
Entrepreneurs do not have to rely upon only economic criteria for their 
future success. They can expect that other people behave in accordance 
with the common value system of society, in other words, the culture of the 
society. For example, brokers who contributed to the recovery from the 
recession might not benefit from the boom of the 1920s. If makers try to 
take advantage of the regional brand of Isesaki and allow as many brokers 
as possible to compete in the market in a bid to make their bargaining 
position better, newcomers would be welcomed. But such a policy was 
against brokers' interests. As the history of the Isesaki weaving industry 
proved, brokers could expect makers' cooperation to guard their economic 
interests. The importance of regional culture was illustrated in the case of 
the bailout plan of Shimojyo. He himself could not anticipate his failure and 
did not expect such help from various people. However, if a leader could 
share common values with other people, he could face up to problems with 
their supports. 
If an entrepreneur can define correctly factors which affect his 
management and he can get enough information without substantial cost, 
we can suppose that he optimize his inputs and outputs rationally. 
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Cooperation of entrepreneurs can be classified as one of collective action 
as well as one of managing natural resources. We can see that the most 
important condition of success is clearly defined a boundary of collective 
action.31 However, the network of Isesaki resident showed that such 
definition was difficult and useless. The fate of a prominent leader of the 
industry depended upon the content of mutual trust or the loyalty to the 
community of people, not only entrepreneurs who joined cooperatives but 
also a politician and businessmen of other industries. 
In this situation we can suppose two criteria in decision-making of 
entrepreneurs. A main criterion is to seek one's own objectives. It can be 
termed a private principle. The second criterion is to collaborate with the 
value which regional people have in common. It can be termed a regional 
principle. When communitarian features in Japanese economy are 
emphasized, this second criterion has been evaluated too much. This 
regional principle cannot have the same importance as the private principle. 
That implies that if an entrepreneur forget his main objective, his 
companies will lose the basis of their economic activity. This was proved by 
the fact that Isesaki Bank, which was too lenient to its clients, accumulated 
soured loans and its stock price declined. Many shareholders in the region 
suffered capital loss as a result. 
The Isesaki region with rich social stock failed in taking a course of 
virtuous cycles in the 1930s. The cooperative could not find effective 
policies in the recession of the textile market. The department stores sold 
Isesaki products at discounted prices to attract consumers whose income 
drastically decreased in the recession. The skill of management, regional 
brands and other social capital were transferred to newcomers without 
paying accumulated cost. The cooperative did not control supply and the 
market was flooded with products which were produced not only by 
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out-house laborers in Isesaki but also neighboring regions. The 
deterioration of the makers' financial situation destroyed loyalty, mutual 
trust and social capital to the extent that cooperatives split and patterns 
were pirated. 
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要約 
伝統的織物業における組合とその指導者 
 
松嵜久実 
 
日本の明治・大正期における農村織物業は、多数の中小企業によって営ま
れ、そうした業者は、同業組合に組織化されていた。本稿では、群馬県伊勢
崎織物と、奈良県大和織物の組合の事例から、組合活動が開始される過程、
組合参加者とりわけ組合の指導者の活動の動機、そして組合活動が有効に機
能する要因を考察する。 
同業者の組合活動は、広い社会科学の文脈でいえば、集団行為 Collective 
Action であり、活動の分析は、Social Capital がどのように経済活動に影響を
及ぼし、また、逆に経済活動が Social Capital にどのように規定され、形成さ
れるかを考察することである。 
対象の時期における織物需要の全体的な動向、流通構造の変化を明らかに
した上で、二つの組合活動の事例を分析している。 
伊勢崎織物の事例は、共同体的資本主義の典型であり、他方、大和木綿の
事例は、自己の利益を追求する企業の間で、共同行為の実現がいかに困難で
あるかを示していることが明らかにされた。 
大和木綿の場合は、消費地に近く、産地の業者は消費地問屋と密接な関係
があった。また、木綿は当時需要されていた織物のなかで、相対的にいって
低価格品であった。こうしたことから、組合として品質を高めて地域ブラン
ドを維持する必要性が弱かった。 
これに対して、伊勢崎織物の場合は、京阪と東京のいずれの消費地とも離
れており、消費地問屋と産地の業者の関係は弱かった。また、生産されてい
た絹織物は、相対的に高価格品・奢侈品であり、品質を高め、地域ブランド
を高めることが、産地の発展のために必要であった。こうした経済的な要因
に加えて、伊勢崎では、明治期の自由民権運動の歴史から地域に政治的共同
行為の伝統が形成されており、人々の重層的なネットワークが存在していた。
地域の Social Capital が既に存在していたこと、Social Capital を形成させる経
済的要因が存在していたことが、伊勢崎織物の同業者の共同行為を発展させ
ていたことが、明らかにされた。 
